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We inherit the world 
From our ancestors 
In trust 
For our children 
-African proverb 
No nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose 
people are poor and miserable, argued an eminent classical 
political economist. He went on to state that enabling the 
majority to be un-poor and un-miserable (in modern 
terminology, to climb out of absolute poverty in order to meet 
at least their basic needs) was an overriding duty on all persons 
and on the state. For him it was a matter not of the economy 
of the market nor of political economy, but of the moral 
economy. 
No, that author was not Karl Marx. He was Adam Smith. 
His statement of principle is as important to the situation and 
the future of children in South Africa as the African proverb. 
Indeed, the two complement each other. We know all too 
well that the world most of us have inherited is mean, shabby 
and in danger of worsening. We do not want to hand it on in 
that shape (let alone a worse state) to our children. And, like 
Adam Smith, we feel a moral imperative to strive to improve 
it for their sakes as much as for our own. 
Therefore in South Africa - indeed, more widely - any 
technical or political economic policy should be judged in 
terms of three moral economy tests: 
• will it reduce or increase the numbers of human beings 
condemned to exist in absolute poverty? 
• will it rebuild or erode the world we pass OJ). to our 
children? 
• will it enable our children to live in a better world and 
have a better chance to fulfil themselves than most of us 
have had? 
These are both technical and moral questions. If policies do 
not actually overcome gross imbalances - say, in the allocation 
of foreign exchange or in the provision of health care for 
children- and do not increase resource availability over time, 
then, however moral they may seem in principle, they will in 
the end immiserise. On the other hand, even if they do close 
imbalances and lead to overall resource growth, if they do 
not enable ordinary households to earn their basic needs, have 
access to basic services, or offer their children access to a 
decent life, they are not development and ultimately will 
certainly explode or implode for political and social reasons. 
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They will probably self-destruct economically too, because 
of the constraints they impose on domestic market growth. 
Unfortunately, as the great conservative Caribbean economist, 
Sir W. Arthur Lewis, has concluded, most approaches to 
economic development do not pass either test: 'What have 
we learnt from development? Development leaves the great 
bulk of the population unaffected.' 
In South Africa, in fact, the record has been worse than that. 
Economic development under apartheid left the majority of 
the people socially, politically and, less uniformly, materially 
worse off. This was especially true before the countervailing 
power of the trade unions rapidly raised real wages of black 
union members in the 1980s. Even now for many squatter 
towns and rural households, no such partial gains have trickled 
down. If we agree with Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's affirmation 
that 'the ultimate purpose, measure, justification and test of 
development is man' or with the Gospel statement that 
'inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these my children 
ye have done it unto Me', then we can take but little 
satisfaction in economic development in most of Africa and 
next to none in South Africa. True, South Africa has a 
substantial black middle class, but it also has at least 25 per 
cent black absolute poverty, measured in terms of both 
household income and access to basic social and human 
services. 
In the end, apartheid economics failed even at the economistic 
level. International sanctions reduced exports and external 
capital flows, 'security' expenditures bled the budget, the 
narrow home market base could not sustain buoyancy, and 
discrimination blocked the way of a broad base of high 
productivity workers. Between 1980 and 1992 South Africa's 
economic performance was in the bottom quarter of the Sub-
Saharan African economies, themselves the world's poorest 
performing group in the impoverished South. 
From national stagnation to child deprivation 
What has this to do with children? The answer is very simple. 
While some gains can be made by child-specific programmes, 
such as extended programmes of immunisation or community 
designed and monitored health and nutrition programmes for 
under-fives, most must address the basic requirements of the 
families of whom children are members. A mother worn down 
by 16 hours of work daily cannot find time to feed a young 
child the six to eight times a day needed for good nutrition. 
A household using every minute to raise crops or earn money 
to survive cannot afford to send children regularly to even 
tuition-free schools. When everyone in a household is 
seriously hungry, trying to target under-five malnutrition (a 
rather inappropriate terminology suggesting that the children, 
not the malnutrition, are the targets of heavy policy artillery) 
is hard to do, for the whole family will share, quite 
understandably, any additional food. 
To meet the goals of the Children's Summit Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child, as now embodied in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, or their African affirmation by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, more is needed than 
a set of small, discrete programmes for children. What is 
required is real movement towards a just society, in which 
absolutely poor households are assisted and provided with 
access to services and to markets to eradicate absolute poverty. 
Primarily, that means empowerment, with the creation of 
safety nets for unempowerable- ie, too many mouths per able-
bodied pairs of hands - households. 
Structural adjustment is the term usually employed to define 
World Bank- and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-
approved and codesigned programmes for managing and 
reducing gross imbalances ('stabilisation'), decreasing the 
scope of state intervention and centring it on fiscal and 
monetary policy ('liberalisation') and restoring output growth 
above that of population ('sustainable growth'). It includes 
fully national programmes designed to achieve the same ends 
even if the World Bank and IMF are not formally installed. 
Debate is no longer primarily about whether to reduce 
imbalances, alter policy or restore growth in total output per 
capita, but about the particular instruments and sequences 
employed to achieve these ends, and about sharing initial costs 
and subsequent gains. 
Much of the dialogue is rather counterproductive because at 
one extreme, critics conflate 1960s IMF stabilisation with 
the whole of structural adjustment- an interpretation which 
was never accurate and has become increasingly less so since 
1985. On the other hand, advocates attribute to structural 
adjustment policies a whole of a general shift from 'free fall' 
by most African economies in 1985 to modest per capita 
growth by some by 1990- a characterisation that is not readily 
demonstrable from available data. 
More relevant debates have focused on adjusting general 
macroeconomic policy models to relate to specific national 
contextual realities, making better functioning markets 
genuinely accessible to household and other small producers 
(without which nominal economic incentives are 
meaningless), and increasing human investment (especially 
in basic health, education, water and production extension 
services) while narrowing budget deficits. Debates also centre 
on determining whether wages below the household absolute 
poverty line, but above present labour productivity, pose a 
case for real wage increases to minimum efficiency levels -
that case's economic foundation assumes that workers, too, 
respond to economic incentives. Alternatively, is the case 
for real-wage erosion to shore up enterprise or state budgets, 
or for sackings (with or without higher real wages for those 
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not 'redeployed' to unemployment or residual sector 
activities), and deciding what safety nets are necessary and 
possible for which groups of absolutely poor people and to 
what extent significant numbers of absolutely poor households 
can be enabled to produce more. 
By 1989, the World Bank endorsed economic transformation 
based on enhanced human investment and provision of 
infrastructure, and a reduction of absolute poverty backed up 
by safety nets. It advocated incentives including market access 
measures to ensure four per cent or higher annual overall 
output and food production growth, four per cent annual 
increase in net external resource inflows as well as substantial 
write-offs of official and commercial external debts - other 
than those to the IMF and World Bank (implicitly 60 to 90 
per cent write-downs for low income African nations and 
Brady terms- debt rescheduling plus access to new borrowing 
-for lower middle income countries). It also gave specific 
attention to ecological and gender issues. 
Apart from an arguably excessive blindness to market 
imperfections and a somewhat archaic faith that the invisible 
hand of perfect competition still automatically makes 
liberalisation egalitarian, the strategy as set out in the 1989 
Long term perspective study is not a real focus of debate. 
Rather, it is difficult to relate the Study to many country 
programmes, including some recent ones, notably Zimbabwe's 
costly dash for liberalisation in 1991. In Zimbabwe there 
was little phasing or attention to the costs of destabilisation 
or their implications for policy transition, all of which clearly 
increased structural imbalances and increased absolute 
poverty in the short-run, thereby putting the 1980-1990 
upward trends in human investment, exports and output per 
capita at risk even before the 1991-1993 drought and hunger 
crisis. 
Moreover, despite initiatives from 1987 under the rubric 'The 
social dimensions of adjustment' (SDA), very few structural 
adjustment programmes actually put sustainable employment 
and production increases for poor persons within their 
strategic core. These usually appear as add-ons with a massive 
bias to politically sensitive and direct victims of public sector 
retrenchment and to peripheral 'make work' jobs, not to a 
strategic reformulation nor to a broad front strategy to enable 
poor households to overcome absolute poverty. 
Finally, just as small, underfunded, marginal 'women in 
development' projects running parallel to 'mainline' activities 
amount tofemalestans to 'give dolls to the girls', so too, many 
'social dimension' add-ons look likely to marginalise poor 
people in ghettos rather than help them into mainstream 
economic activity. 
Verbally - and in the 1989 World Bank formulation -
UNICEF's campaign for 'adjustment with a human face' has 
clearly won. Unfortunately, in practice this is far from being 
the case. Instead, many programmes for a variety of reasons 
remain uncontextual and treat the 25 to 65 per cent of total 
households that are absolutely poor as peripheral recipients 
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of scraps of aid and not as a priority core area for economic 
rehabilitation. This tendency has been exacerbated by 
drawing distinctions between those absolutely poor 
households that are victims of structural adjustment and 
others, as if absolute poverty were not a massive 
macroeconomic imbalance any structural adjustment 
programme has a duty to address. 
If development is about human welfare, then absolute poverty 
is a basic structural imbalance to be adjusted or transformed. 
The main routes to reducing absolute poverty are by enabling 
poor people to produce more, providing universal access to 
basic services (human investment), and enhancing 
infrastructure (including markets) relevant to poor persons. 
These approaches are consistent with structural adjustment 
programme macroeconomics and are capable of raising - not 
merely redistributing - output. However, they require not 
merely will, but systematic articulation of strategies, policies, 
resource allocations and programmes. Nowhere do these 
points hold more true than in South Africa today. 
Structural adjustment and transformation in South 
Africa? 
South Africa's economy is in dire need of structural adjustment 
and transformation for four reasons. 
• Between 1980-1993 overall output shrank up to two per 
cent per capita per year, putting it well below even the 
African average. 
• Despite this record, the external trade balance has remained 
precarious and the fiscal one so unsound that universal 
basic service provision and adequate maintenance of 
infrastructure are often viewed as totally unattainable for 
up to two decades. 
• Apartheid's legacy of exploitation and exclusion has locked 
South Africa into a low, and arguably falling, labour 
productivity syndrome and high levels of violence (about 
75 per cent of which is not directly political). If these are 
not reversed, they will worse:1 the already dismal output, 
external balance and fiscal positions. 
• Affirmative action and redistribution (especially, but not 
only out of the proceeds of a healthy output growth rate, 
the peace dividend and political transformation) is essential 
to reduce what are probably the world's highest levels of 
inequality - and clear inequity - of income, of access to 
services and of social and political participation. Without 
them violent unrest- most of it not directly political even 
ifthe socioeconomic setting, which gives rise to it, is very 
much apartheid's child- as well as passive resistance will 
continue to block any economic transformation and, 
indeed, will erode even present performance. 
The previous government's response was a tragic parody of 
an ill-designed, early 1980s structural adjustment programme. 
Budget cuts devastated both maintenance of infrastructure 
and provision of basic services, while allowing continuation 
of large expenditures on military forces and on 'duplicative, 
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inefficient, and often corrupt bureaucracies. Real-wage cuts 
were a clear- if not publicly affirmed- goal. High, real interest 
rates crippled investment and growth with limited, Jagged 
gains on inflation or external investment accounts. Safety 
nets - notably the universal old age pension - were marked 
down for dismantling. The balance of Jiberalisation and 
promotion measure suggested a belief that unemployment was 
officially perceived as a synonym for redeployment. 
A dialogue on economic strategy with a direct input on state 
policy from social sectors, households and enterprises is 
urgently needed. The ANC's painstakingly built-up and 
widely discussed strategy represents a start, but it still lacks 
detail and financing. South Africa cannot afford the luxury 
of solely concentrating on the political transformation, while 
an excessively unwise or unlucky economic and social policy 
debilitates a sick economy and a sicker society, and corrodes 
any foundation on which political reconciliation could be 
sustained. 
Yes, this does relate to children. The majority of poor people 
are children, partly because a major cause of poverty is that 
there are too few adult-earners to feed the families. In South 
Africa, as in Sub-Saharan Africa generally, the majority of 
children are poor. If real medical budgets are cut, any massive 
increase in immunisation, in rural and peri-urban primary 
health care, in maternal health support facilities, in health 
education (eg, for breastfeeding and oral rehydration, and 
for personal actions to avoid HIV/AIDS infection) will not 
be possible. If infrastructure disintegrates, people in the 
peripheries - rural and peri-urban - will be denied effective 
market access and cannot be enabled to earn enough to feed 
their households (including their children) properly, no matter 
how much nutrition education is pumped out. 
If universal old age pensions are cut or allowed to erode in 
real terms (as opposed to being consolidated toward uniform, 
non racial levels augmented to offset inflation, as is being 
done in Namibia). there will be more absolutely poor 
households. Not least, there will be more poor rural 
grandmothers who are no longer able to provide proper care 
and nutrition to children left with them by working, urban 
daughters. If the macro-policy is wrong, trying to alleviate 
the effects of absolute poverty becomes impossible. If 
households are absolutely poor, low-cost interventions, such 
as immunisation or oral rehydration, can help some children 
to survive, but cannot provide them with protection of their 
rights to a decent life, or to a meaningful preparation for 
adulthood. 
Closely related to serving children and the future are gender 
issues. This is only partly because mothers do in fact, provide 
most childcare and household-care of the sick more generally. 
More importantly, up to a quarter of households are female-
headed and because most of these have unfavourable hands-
to-mouths ratios, a majority of these (including their children) 
are poor. Women's education, job opportunities, access to 
resources for household and coop production, total workload 
reduction (eg, by bringing pure water and primary health care 
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closer to them) and women's involvement in basic service 
planning and management (eg, of rural and peri-urban water, 
sanitation and health care)- all of these matter to child survival 
and child development. 
As in other aspects of poverty reduction through 
empowerment, gender requires both detailed contextual 
knowledge and listening to perceived needs. If women's 
workloads prevent adequate childcare, household upkeep and 
rest, then work reduction efforts should be targeted to reduce 
that workload - eg, through closer wood, water and health 
service supplies, and easier access to simple agricultural 
processing. If women are responsible for food provisioning 
and most expenditure on behalf of children, safety net 
distribution should be to senior female household members. 
If maintenance is 'women's work', then rural and peri-urban 
water-user communities need female majorities and 
maintenance training directed to women. If 25 per cent of 
households are female-headed, and 75 per cent of adult 
females earn incomes (in cash or self-provisioning), then 
labour intensive works programmes must see and hire women 
needing and seeking employment - if necessary, by 
establishing a minimum quota system, as in Botswana. 
Whether women are inherently pro-environment (presumably 
on mothering and nurturing grounds) is debatable. What is 
clear is that degradation of fuel and water supplies, rural land, 
and sanitation and general amenities in urban and peri-urban 
areas usually has a disproportionately heavy impact on 
women's workloads. These concerns should be identified 
and built into any serious local or national environmental 
protection and rehabilitation strategy. 
Some lessons from the region 
South Africa has now entered into a period of political 
economic structural adjustment and - hopefully -
transformation. This is a social and political, as weB as an 
economic, necessity. Equally inevitably, all manner of 
individuals and external institutions (public, private, bilateral, 
multilateral and non governmental) have arrived, asserting 
their expertise (which may or may not exist) and their ability 
to generate massive inward resource transfers (which may 
not or may, to a lesser degree, exist). Both fortunately (as it 
provides room for manoeuvre) and unfortunately (as it is 
confusing and time consuming), they will disagree 
substantially on major goals, radically on the instruments and 
sequences, and nearly tota11y on priorities. In practice they 
will agree on one thing: South Africa and South Africans 
should be accountable to them, but not they to South Africa 
or South Africans. 
Prominent among these waves of incoming experts - whose 
1993 and 1994 flows will soon be perceived as having been 
merely advance trickles - will be the World Bank, the IMF 
and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). They have 
their uses: to publicise, mobilise and advise, and, to a much 
lesser extent, to finance and locate useful personnel. But 
these uses can, if there is no clearly articulated, innovative 
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and firmly argued South African position, result in the 
externalisation of both macroeconomic and social policy and 
of macroeconomic and social advisors. Further, it will 
probably result in the marginalisation of affirmative action to 
empower victims of apartheid policies, and of the 
rehabilitation of the livelihoods of excluded households and 
basic service provision linked to production by poor people 
as a strategic assault on absolute poverty. For example, if 
housing is to be a central force toward increasing employment 
and purchasing power and to be affordable, it should be build 
by small enterprises, often using work teams recruited by a 
skilled artisan/foreman and supervised by the owner-to-be. 
Relevant standards are for the community/local government 
to set. Imported materials, sophisticated designs, and 
equipment-intensive building methods should be avoided. 
Problems of linking to financial institutions arise - present 
banks and other mortgage-providers can only operate if a 
reliable set of retail intermediaries are designed and put to 
work. 
There are lessons for South Africa to Jearn from the 
independent states of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) -the pre-South African accession SADC 
10- for most have (or are negotiating) structural adjustment 
programmes. The notable exception is Botswana, which 
combines avoidance of serious imbalances (while building 
up reserves to adjust to shocks) with innovative employment, 
basic service, children's welfare and poverty reduction 
strategies. Their experience is more relevant to South Africa 
than that of northern advocates and designers of structural 
adjustment in at least one sense: they too, have been on the 
receiving end and come from societies in which absolute 
poverty is endemic. 
Lesson 1. Children, women and absolutely poor households 
are usua11y quite invisible to macro and even most sectoral 
economic policy practitioners and theoreticians. Ending 
invisibility is a necessary first step to ensuring that macro 
and sectoral policies not merely measure 'impact' on these 
persons, but also see them as a means to achieving economic 
objectives. This is more possible in a democratic 
environment, for politicians - including Treasury Ministers 
on occasion.- are more likely to take Adam Smith's 'moral 
economy' argument seriously if they are, or see themselves 
to be, accountable to a broad constituency, including poor 
voters and their civil society organisations. 
Stressing human investment, the importance of micro and 
household enterprises, and the wastefulness of un- or low-
productivity employment are ways to begin the process of 
making the poor visible. Furthermore, such an emphasis 
facilitates understanding of the gains made by enabling poor 
people to produce and earn, rather than require safety nets 
while adding little to the production or to the tax base. 
Globally there are more than fifty SDA programmes. Political 
decisions- for instance, on a National Programme of Action 
for Children in Namibia, on rehabilitation of households 
wiped out by war in Mozambique, or on offsetting drought 
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losses first for the poor households (not the large farmers and 
their lenders) with priority to women and children in Botswana 
- should prioritise and provide strategic goals. These should 
be backed by the allocation of able professions and 
administrators to articulate, mobilise and incorporate moral 
economy goals into mainline Ministry programmes. While 
such is essential to success, it is much less common. 
Lesson 2. Having local contextual realities accepted as 
important in shaping sequences, priorities and instruments 
requires that a state dig in its heels, present a reasoned (and 
reasonable) case and have some ability to say 'no' or to act 
on its own (at least for a while). Mozambique's use of a 
second window to close exchange rate imbalances and 
Tanzania's sliding devaluations are examples, as, more 
broadly, is the radical transformation of World Bank thinking 
on Mozambique. There the Bank moved to an acceptance 
that absolute poverty is the most serious, single imbalance 
and that, without effective action to reduce it, demand reflation 
and a mutually reinforcing rural/urban growth cycle cannot 
be restored in Mozambique. 
Lesson 3. The national case needs to be made and put by 
national institutions. It may be necessary to use expatriates, 
but those working on the national case should (as in Botswana) 
be in, and accountable to, national institutions (including 
domestic NGOs) not de jure or de facto accountable only to 
each other or to external agencies, as is terrifyingly common 
in Mozambique. National capacity building necessarily is 
within the nation, not simply territorially, but also 
institutionally. Today much technical assistance in Africa 
does not meet this test and is, in fact, national capacity-
fragmenting and disabling. 
Lesson 4. It is important to avoid complexity and parallel 
lines of operation. Autonomous or parallel government rural 
development efforts - even with substantial funding and 
external goodwill - have a near uniform record of failure 
(notably in Tanzania and Mozambique) and are totally at odds 
with participatory decentralisation. Complex systems 
requiring detailed charts and notes to comprehend (as 
frequently in Zambian agricultural marketing) are not, in 
practice, understandable to operational administrators much 
less to the intended beneficiaries. Simple approaches with 
clear goals, procedures and lines of authority can and yield 
rapid, significant results. Good examples include mother-
and-childcare and immunisation projects in Mozambique's 
cities as well as the district-based and community-backed child 
nutrition and women's livelihood programmes in Tanzania. 
Lesson 5. Avoid undistributed middles and artificial 
categories. The present division of aid into two categories-
'emergency' (survival) and 'development' (programme and 
project) - fails both tests. Emergencies are not one-off, 
unrepeating events which require only survival assistance and 
no overt attention to livelihood rehabilitation or vulnerability 
reduction. UNICEF and Botswana have learned and acted 
on that lesson in respect to droughts, as have Tanzania and 
Mozambique, though with a lower capacity to act. Livelihood 
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rehabilitation is essential if the victims of war, drought and 
apartheid-linked exclusion are to be enabled to produce and 
avail themselves of human investment opportunities. But it 
is rarely seen as a key area or as a continuum linking 
emergency and development, so it does not receive 
macroeconomic attention nor serious resource allocations. 
Lesson 6. Safety nets are needed, and - with innovative 
thinking and action - are often rather more possible to create 
than is supposed. Not all poor households can produce their 
way out of misery. Vulnerable households need survival 
assistance ( eg, drought victims who are fired/not hired when 
crops are wiped out) when their vulnerability comes home to 
roost. Universal old-age pensions; wage supplements to large 
households and low-income formal sector employees; 
effective food provisioning (in support of vulnerability-
reducing work if possible) to climate-stricken rural areas; cash 
supplements for buying food, given to unempowerable, urban 
households which simply do not have the labour power to 
become self-sustaining; even in a crisis soup kitchen run by 
domestic social sector organisations - each of these safety 
nets is used effectively within one or more SADC countries. 
As only too clearly demonstrated recently in South Africa-
eg, by putting large farmers' (and their creditors') losses ahead 
of their employees' risk of loss of life; by eroding the old-age 
pension system; by not getting NGO-designated, poverty-
offset funding to organisations that demonstrably needed and 
could use it- central governments all to often seem to be the 
opposite of innovative, deeply concerned or able to act 
promptly and relevantly even if they verbally profess to want 
to do so. 
Lesson 7. Governance, and particularly community-basing, 
matters. The Tanzania nutrition programmes are very 
effective at reducing severe malnutrition because of 
community childcare and some food-sharing. In 
Mozambique, both Christian Aid and CAFOD (Catholic Fund 
for Overseas Development) operate entirely through 
Mozambican church social and economic agencies, and are 
usually viewed as financing more cost-efficient programmes 
than most external NGOs. Action Aid's central premise of 
operating with villages in a limited number of districts within 
the framework oflocal government goals demonstrably fosters 
continuity and underpins local Mozambican capacity; whereas 
other external NGOs - notably the two largest- have clearly 
undermined domestic capability. Indeed, one is a self-
professed mortal enemy of the main Mozambican social sector 
organisations from congregational to national level. 
Lesson 8. Coherence and coordination do matter. Primary 
healthcare programmes can be established from immunisation 
projects. Similarly, nutritional programmes can be developed 
by a national coordination unit operating through field-level 
agricultural personnel (as demonstrated in Tanzania). But 
such build-up needs to be planned and coordinated both 
horizontally (eg, between the Ministries of Health and 
Agriculture) and vertically (by community-district-province-
nation). Otherwise, a melange of competing, overlapping, 
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weak programmes will fail to meet basic needs or to yield 
value for money. Throwing more institutions at a problem is 
unlikely to be an answer; getting existing ones to acknowledge 
both the problem and their need to act together toward 
resolving it, can be. External actors - including at times 
UNICEF- are not usually helpful in achieving this, because 
each believes (as it should) that its programmes are important 
and looks for domestic sponsors and channels. 
If a coherent domestic framework is to evolve and be 
sustained, domestic actors must recognise that danger and 
impose a negotiated national strategic and priority 
framework within which all actors (domestic and external) 
must operate or leave the game). 
Conclusion as beginning: What prospects for South 
Africa's children? 
The previous tour de horizon may seem pessimistic. It is not 
so intended and need not be. 
The horrendous state of the South African economy is a 
constraint, but it is also a spur to action. And, however badly 
it has performed for a decade, that economy is both very large 
by African, and moderately large by southern, standards. It 
is also an economy with substantial production, surplus 
generation, personnel and training capacity. 
The criticisms of macroeconomic policy for usually 
overlooking the 'moral economy' and seeing (or rather, not 
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seeing) children as invisible, are real. But, as the context of 
the criticisms shows, perceptions are changing or going back 
to their roots. 'Moral economy' dates to modern political 
economy's founder, while 'the struggle against absolute 
poverty' dates to the World Bank's initial 1970s entry into 
prioritisation of overall economic policy as well as to earlier 
discrete projects and to rehabilitation of production and 
employment during the World Bank's (as the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development) founding years. 
As to the lessons to be learned: South Africa has more 
resources, more analysts, more professionals, more 
community and social sector-based people's organisations and 
NGOs than all the SADC states put together. Indeed, the 
most similar southern case is the Philippines. If there are 
lessons of success from the Filipinos' experience, why be 
pessimistic about South Africa and the future South Africans 
can build for their children? Remember that affirmative action 
is basically about including and empowering, not excluding, 
just as poverty and gender strategies are - or ought to be -
about mainstreaming, not setting up weak, marginal enclaves 
outside central economic and political concerns and resource 
allocations. Such strategies well-enacted can go some way towards 
realising the goal of passing on a better world to our children. 
Reprinted from J. Balch, D. Cammack, P. Johnson and R. 
Morgan (eds) Transcending the legacy: Children in the new 
Southern Africa, AEIISARDCIUNICEF, Amsterdam, Harare, 
Nairobi, August 1995. 
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